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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the implications of macroprudential and monetary policies for business
cycles, welfare, and nancial stability. We consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model with housing and collateral constraints. A macroprudential rule on the loan-to-value ratio
(LTV), which responds to credit growth, interacts with a traditional Taylor rule for monetary policy.
We compute the optimal parameters of these rules both when monetary and macroprudential policies
act in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated way. We nd that both policies acting together
unambiguously improves the stability of the system. In both cases, this interaction is welfare improving
for the society, especially in the case of the non-coordinated game. There is though a trade-o¤between
borrowers and savers. However, borrowers can compensate the savers welfare loss à la Kaldor-Hicks
to achieve a Pareto-superior outcome.
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"Normally, however, the policy rate is not the only available tool, and much better instruments are
available for achieving and maintaining nancial stability. Monetary policy should be the last line of
defence of nancial stability, not the rst line." Svensson (2012)
1 Introduction
The housing sector is key to understand how the recent nancial crisis developed and, therefore, crucial
for designing recovery and prevention policies. The nancial crisis was born in the housing sector, grew
in the nancial sector and had its nal consequences in the real sector. Financial innovations made
the nancial system increasingly complex and interconnected, driving to an expansion of systemic risk,
especially through the mortgage market. In this context, when house prices collapsed, micro-prudential
policies, those dedicated to prevent the risk from each company, had not managed to avoid the contagion
to the real sector and the crisis spread across the nancial system to the real economy. Then, a great
recession a¤ected the whole economy, causing a high level of unemployment. Thus, from a policy
perspective, traditional measures have not seemed to be su¢ cient to, rst, avoid the crisis and, second,
have a fast and e¤ective recovery.
As a result, several institutions have implemented macroprudential tools in order to explicitly pro-
mote the stability of the nancial system in a global sense, not just focusing on individual companies.
The goal of this kind of regulation is to avoid the transmission of nancial shocks to the broader economy.
Some examples of macroprudential tools are asset-side tools (loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income
ratio caps), liquidity-based tools (countercyclical liquidity requirements), or capital-based tools (coun-
tercyclical capital bu¤ers, sectorial capital requirements or dynamic provisions).
The LTV requirement is a limit on the value of a loan relative to the underlying collateral (e.g.
residential property). Several studies have pointed out that higher LTV ratios combined with higher
risk mortgages contributed to the mortgage crisis.1 The LTV is nowadays described as one of the main
macroprudential instruments to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage by the
European Systemic Risk Board.2 Within the EU, LTV limits are available in the national prudential
framework of 16 Member States.3
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the implications of a macroprudential LTV tool for business
1See, for instance, Abraham et al. (2008) and Duca et al. (2011).
2See Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board (2013).
3More world results are available in Lim et al. (2011).
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cycles, nancial stability, and welfare, as well as its interaction with monetary policy. In order to do
that, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which features a housing market.
The modelling framework consists of an economy composed by borrowers and savers. In particular,
our model imposes a limit on borrowing, that is, loans need to be collateralized by a proportion of
the value of the assets that the borrower owns. This proportion can be interpreted as an LTV. The
macroprudential tool we propose is a rule that automatically reduces loan-to-values when there is a
credit boom, therefore limiting the expansion of credit. We assume that there exists a macroprudential
Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to credit growth, in the spirit of the Basel III
regulation which aims at avoiding episodes of excessive credit growth. The monetary policy literature
has extensively shown that simple rules result in a good performance; therefore, it seems sensible to
apply this kind of rules to macroprudential supervision. This microfounded general equilibrium model
allows us to explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy and the credit market.
Furthermore, such a model can deal with welfare-related questions.
In the context of this model, we address several research questions. First, we study the welfare gain
for each agent and for the aggregate both for di¤erent levels of a static LTV and for di¤erent values
of the reaction parameters of the macroprudential rule. In this way, we discuss the welfare trade-o¤s
that may appear between borrowers and savers. Second, we analyze the combination of monetary and
macroprudential policy parameters that maximize welfare when the macroprudential regulator and the
central bank are coordinated and when they are not. Third, we discuss a Pareto-superior outcome to
overcome this trade-o¤ by a system of transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks. Then, we study the dynamics of the
model under the optimal parameters. Finally, we graphically convey our results to highlight the e¤ects
on macroeconomic and nancial stability of introducing a new macroprudential policy based on the LTV
ratio.
The rest of the paper continues as follows: Section 1.1 reviews the literature. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 presents the welfare analysis. Section 4 computes the optimal parameter combination
of the di¤erent policies in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated situation. It also develops a rule to
obtain a Pareto-superior outcome, presents results from simulations, and conveys the results graphically
to show the e¤ects of the macroprudential policy on nancial and macroeconomic stability. Section 5
concludes.
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1.1 Related Literature
Our paper ts into the literature that introduces a macroprudential rule and studies its e¤ects using
a DSGE model. Other examples are, for instance, Antipa et al. (2010), who uses a DSGE model to
show that macroprudential policies would have been e¤ective in smoothing the past credit cycle and in
reducing the intensity of the recession. Another example is Borio and Shim (2007), which emphasizes the
complementary role of macroprudential policy to monetary policy and its supportive role as a built-in
stabilizer. As well, N.Diaye (2009) shows that monetary policy can be supported by countercyclical
prudential regulation. Angelini et al. (2012) uses a DSGE model with a banking sector and shows
interactions between capital requirements ratios as a macroprudential tool and monetary policy; they
nd that macroprudential policies are most helpful to counter nancial shocks that lead the credit
and asset price booms. We nd in our paper that macroprudential policies moderate credit booms.
Furthermore, for housing demand shocks, the combination of the macroprudential and the monetary
policies manages to control credit without moderating the real e¤ects of the boom.
Since there is an extensive consensus that the origin of the last crisis is related to real estate booms
and busts, we have focused on the e¤ects of a macroprudential tool based on the housing sector. However,
while most papers in the eld tend to analyze macroprudential policy through the lens of a counter-
cyclical bank leverage rule (e.g. Angelini et al., 2012, Meh and Moran, 2011), in our paper, we study
how a key element of the real estate sector, namely the LTV, can serve as a macroprudential tool to
improve nancial stability.4 With a macroprudential orientation, Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012)
also examines a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices, output and changes in collateral values with
a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; they remark the importance of identifying the source
of the shock of the housing or price boom when assessing policy optimality. Funke and Paetz (2012)
consider a non-linear version of a macroprudential rule for the LTV. Following this literature, we propose
a macroprudential policy based on a Taylor-type automatic rule.5 By analogy with monetary policy,
rule-based macroprudential tools  for example, automatic stabilizers  appear appealing (Goodhart,
2004).
One question that arises on the topic is what the objective of the macroprudential authority should be.
In recent years, research on macroprudential issues has been wide and intense6 and there an increasing
4Borio et al. (2001) also evaluated limits on the LTV.
5See Borio and Shim (2007) for a distinction is between rules and discretion in calibrating the tools of macroprudential
policy.
6See Galati and Moessner (2013) for an extensive review.
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consensus among academics and policy makers that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy
is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the nancial system as a whole(Recommendation of
the European Systemic Risk Board, 2013). In this way, Almeida, Campello and Liu (2006) has studied
the e¤ect on the amplitude of the credit cycle results from the mitigating impact of more stringent
LTV ratios on the nancial acceleratormechanism. They nd that when a positive income shock leads
to an increase in housing prices, the increase in borrowing is expected to be lower in countries with
lower LTV ratios. Gelain et al. (2013) evaluate di¤erent policy action that might be used to dampen
the resulting excess volatility, including a direct response to house-price growth or credit growth in the
central banks interest rate rule, the imposition of a more restrictive loan-to-value ratio, and the use
of a modied collateral constraint that takes into account the borrowers wage income. We contribute
to this line of research nding that when we use the macroprudential policy based on the LTV, both
the macroeconomy and the nancial system become more stable. To illustrate that, we construct policy
frontiers (Taylor curves) including not only the traditional objectives of monetary policy but also the
objective of the macroprudential regulator; nancial stability. As a measure of nancial stability we
propose the variability of borrowing. This three-dimensional policy frontier shows graphically that
the macroprudential policy unambiguously helps to achieve a more stable nancial and macroeconomic
situation.
A central issue that we cover in our paper is the interaction between monetary and macroprudential
policies. There is no consensus on whether both policies should act in a coordinated or in a non-
coordinated way. For instance, Bean et al. (2010), with a DSGE model adapted from Gertler and Karadi
(2011), studies how the use of a macroprudential policy tool based on a lump-sum levy or subsidy on
the banking sector might a¤ect the conduct of monetary policy. Their results suggest that monetary
and macroprudential policies should be coordinated, since they are not merely substitutes, but they
mention that the issue of coordination needs to be studied further. Beau et al. (2012) claims that it is
preferable to have a combination of separate objectives for monetary and macroprudential policies, with
monetary policy taking the macroeconomic e¤ects of macroprudential policy into account in choosing
interest rates, that is, the non-coordinated case would be preferable. Angelini et al. (2012) studies the
coordination issue in a context in which the macroprudential regulator uses capital requirements as a tool
to achieve nancial stability. They nd that lack of cooperation between a macroprudential authority
and a central bank may actually generate conicting policies and therefore cooperation is preferred. In
our paper, we also distinguish between the cases of coordination and non-coordination to try to shed
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some light to this issue. As argued by Svensson (2012), we nd that the non-coordination game delivers
higher social welfare and therefore is preferable. When each authority focuses on its own objective, they
are more e¤ective in minimizing both macroeconomic and nancial variability.
Finally, measuring the potential welfare improvement of macroprudential policies has deserved special
attention of the academics. Some papers have found that the macroprudential reaction to exogenous
shocks can make some people better o¤ (typically borrowers), but not every type of households, or
not in all cases. For instance, Lambertini et al. (2013) extends the Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model to
incorporate news shocks and a macroprudential rule on the LTV. They nd that an optimized LTV-ratio
rule that responds to credit growth is a Pareto-improving policy compared to the use of a constant LTV
ratio. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), performed a welfare analysis in a DSGE model with borrowers
and savers and determined that although high LTV ratios have a direct positive e¤ect on welfare through
constraint relaxation, other indirect e¤ects may dominate. Angelini et al. (2012) also discusses the issue
and conclude that there is no regime that makes all agents better-o¤. They claim that the optimal (from
a welfare perspective) monetary and macroprudential policies may depend on which agents welfare
is used as objective in the computation of the policies, and also on the type of shock considered. In
our paper, we actively contribute to this discussion. We focus on highlighting the welfare trade-o¤s
between agents in order to carefully characterize the conditions under which there is room for Pareto
improvements. By analyzing welfare for a static LTV, we nd an LTV threshold below which there is
room for Pareto-improving solutions. However, for higher values the trade-o¤ between borrowers and
savers appears. Since, a plausible value for the LTV tends to be higher than this value, when calculating
the optimal macroprudential rule, we also observe this trade-o¤. Thus, we propose a system of transfers
à la Kaldor-Hicks in which borrowers would compensate savers so that they are indi¤erent between
having or not the macroprudential policy. In this way, we obtain a Pareto-superior outcome.7
2 Model Setup
The modeling framework is a DSGE model with a housing market, following Iacoviello (2005). The model
is solved by log-linearizing the equilibrium equations around a well-dened steady state. The use of DSGE
models for the study of macroprudential policies has some limitations and deserves some discussion.
When using DSGE models for monetary policy evaluation, the dynamics of the model are matched
7This is the rst time that this criterion is applied in the macroprudential context albeit it is widely used in regulatory
analysis in Law and Economics. See for instance Posner (2007).
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with the monetary policy transmission mechanism found in the data. However, for macroprudential
policies, empirical applications are rare. Furthermore, the macroprudential analysis often refers to the
vulnerability of the nancial system to exceptional events related to non-equilibrium, which cannot be
captured by a DSGE model. At the same time, a drawback of DSGE models is that they are innite
horizons models and therefore are not well suited to incorporate state contingency in a meaningful way.
As a result, DSGE models have problems of modelling nancial intermediation and frictions (Bean,
2009). However, regardless these limitations, DSGE models are often used for macroprudential analysis
since they count with other advantages; rst, they can be compared with a benchmark in which there
is only monetary policy. Second, they include many sources of shocks that can be used to check for
di¤erent economic trajectories. Moreover, they rely on general equilibrium analysis and are suitable for
simulations to study the impact of new policy instruments. Also, calibrated parameters can be altered to
test for alternative policy scenarios. And nally, since DSGE models are microfounded, they are suitable
to study welfare issues.8
In our model, the economy features patient and impatient households, a nal goods rm, and a
central bank which conducts monetary policy. Households work and consume both consumption goods
and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers are
credit constrained and need collateral to obtain loans. The representative rm converts household
labor into the nal good. The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates. The
macroprudential authority sets the LTV following a Taylor-type rule.
2.1 Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours:
max
Cs;t;Hs;t;Ns;t
E0
1X
t=0
ts

logCs;t + jt logHs;t   (Ns;t)



;
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs;t, Hs;t and
Ns;t represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= (   1) is
the labor supply elasticity,  > 0: jt represents the weight of housing in the utility function. We assume
that log (jt) = log(j)+uJt, where uJt follows an autoregressive process. A shock to jt represents a shock
to the marginal utility of housing.
8See Brázdik et al. (2012) for further discussion.
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Subject to the budget constraint:
Cs;t + bt + qt (Hs;t  Hs;t 1) = Rt 1bt 1
t
+ ws;tNs;t + Ft; (1)
where bt denotes bank deposits, Rt is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in
units of consumption, and ws;t is the real wage rate. Ft are lump-sum prots received from the rms.
The rst order conditions for this optimization problem are as follows:
1
Cs;t
= sEt

Rt
t+1Cs;t+1

; (2)
wst = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t; (3)
jt
Hs;t
=
1
Cs;t
qt   sEt 1
Cs;t+1
qt+1: (4)
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (4)
represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, benets for consuming
housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (3) is the labor-supply condition.
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
max
Cb;t;Hb;t;Nb;t
E0
1X
t=0
tb

logCb;t + jt logHb;t   (Nb;t)



;
where b 2 (0; 1) is impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral
constraint:
Cb;t +
Rt 1bt 1
t
+ qt (Hb;t  Hb;t 1) = bt +Wb;tNb;t; (5)
Et
Rt
t+1
bt = ktEtqt+1Hb;t; (6)
where bt denotes bank loans and Rt is the gross interest rate. kt can be interpreted as a loan-to-
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value ratio. The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing
holdings. The rst order conditions are as follows:
1
Cb;t
= bEt

Rt
t+1Cb;t+1

+ tRt; (7)
wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (8)
jt
Hb;t
=
1
Cb;t
qt   bEt

1
Cb;t+1
qt+1

  tktEt (qt+1t+1) : (9)
where t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.9 These rst order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and
exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (10)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good rm chooses
Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (11)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (12)
9Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the
collateral constraint holds with equality.
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2.3.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtNs;t (z)
Nb;t (z)
(1 ) ; (13)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.10 This Cobb-Douglas
production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect
substitutes. This specication is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady
state of the model. This assumption can be economically justied by the fact that savers are the managers
of the rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers.11
At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (14)
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology. We
normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
ws;t =
1
Xt

Yt
Ns;t
; (15)
wb;t =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Nb;t
; (16)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.12
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1  ;2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being
able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0; (17)
10Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
11 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced.
12Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
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where "= ("  1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (18)
Using (17) and (18) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve bt = Etbt+1  bxt+ut, that relates ination positively to future ination and negatively
to the markup (  (1  ) (1  ) =). ut is a normally distributed cost-push shock.13
2.4 Monetary Policy
We consider a Taylor rule which responds to ination and output growth:
Rt = (Rt 1)

(t)
(1+R ) (Yt=Yt 1)
R
y R
1 
"Rt; (19)
where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, R  0 and Ry  0 measure
the response of interest rates to current ination and output growth, respectively. "Rt is a white noise
shock with zero mean and variance 2" .
2.5 A Macroprudential Rule for the LTV
In standard models, the LTV ratio is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTV ratios as a way to moderate credit booms. When the
LTV ratio is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint is binding, borrowers
will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore
restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed
Taylor-type rules for the LTV ratio so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of
GDP, credits, the credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices. These rules can be a simple illustration of how
a macroprudential policy could work in practice. Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential
Taylor-type rule for the LTV ratio, so that it responds to credit growth, in the spirit of the Basel III
13Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
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regulation which aims at avoiding episodes of excessive credit growth:14
kt = kSS

Bt
Bt 1
 kb
; (20)
where kSS is a steady state value for the loan-to-value ratio, and kb  0 measures the response of the
loan-to-to value to the credit growth. This kind of rule would deliver a lower LTV ratio in booms, when
there is excessive credit growth, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and avoiding a credit
boom derived from good economic conditions (and symmetrically for recessions).15
2.6 Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Yt = Cs;t + Cb;t: (21)
The total supply of housing is xed and it is normalized to unity:
Hs;t +Hb;t = 1: (22)
3 Welfare
3.1 Welfare Measure
To assess the normative implications of the macroprudential and monetary policies, we numerically
evaluate the welfare derived in each case. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008), the two
approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGEmodels include either characterizing
the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural
equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino and Pescatori
(2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents
14See Kannan et al (2012) for a similar specication.
15The feasibility of a implementing a LTV rule at quarterly frequency may be questionable in practice. However, as the
Committee on the Global Financial System (2012) suggests, once the legal and operational infrastructure is in place, LTV
changes can be implemented rather rapidly, given that many jurisdictions have ample experience with these tools at the
practical level.
12
separately.16 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers, respectively, as follows:
Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (23)
Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j logHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)



; (24)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual
welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Wt = (1  s)Ws;t + (1  b)Wb;t: (25)
Each agent´s welfare is weighted by her discount factor; respectively, so that the all the groups receive
the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream.
However, in order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of con-
sumption equivalents. The consumption equivalent measure denes the constant fraction of consumption
that households should give away in order to obtain the benets of the macroprudential policy. A pos-
itive value means a welfare gain, that is, how much the consumer would be willing to pay to obtain
the welfare improvement. Then, when there is a welfare gain, households would be willing to pay in
consumption units for the measure to be implemented because it is welfare improving. We use as a
benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active and compare it with the
welfare obtained when such policy is implemented. The derivation of the welfare benets in terms of
consumption equivalent units is as follows:
CEs = exp

(1  s)
 
WMPs  W s
  1; (26)
CEb = exp

(1  b)
 
WMPb  W b
  1; (27)
where the superscripts in the welfare values denote the benchmark case when macroprudential policies
16We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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Figure 1: Welfare gains from increasing the LTV ratio, everything else constant. Benchmark case: no
macroprudential regulator.
are not introduced and the case in which they are, respectively.17
3.2 Welfare Trade-o¤s
The literature typically nds that the macroprudential reaction to exogenous shocks can make some
people better o¤ (typically borrowers), but not every type of households, or not in all cases. This is why,
welfare comparisons should not only be made on the basis of an ad-hoc aggregate welfare function but
disaggregating welfare between agents, to highlight the trade-o¤s that may appear between them.
In this section, we rst compute welfare for each individual and for the aggregate, when we have
a static LTV. Then, we numerically evaluate welfare gains when we introduce a macroprudential rule,
given the Taylor rule.
Figure 1 presents welfare gains, in consumption equivalents, for di¤erent values of the LTV, when
there is no macroprudential rule in place. Here, we observe that up to a threshold LTV value, there is
room for Pareto optimal policies. However, starting from a value of 0.55, there is a trade-o¤ between
borrowers and savers in terms of welfare when we keep increasing the LTV. Large values of the LTV harm
borrowers while savers benet from the increase. Social welfare decreases. This result is in line with that
of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), who performed a welfare analysis in a DSGE model with borrowers
and savers and determined that although high LTV ratios have a direct positive e¤ect on welfare through
17We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
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Figure 2: Welfare gains from introducing the macroprudential rule, given monetary policy (di¤erent
values of the reaction parameter for borrowing).
constraint relaxation, other indirect e¤ects may dominate. Notice that k, the LTV ratio, is a parameter
that strongly a¤ects the collateral constraint. A small change in this parameter can cause very large
changes in borrowing that can be excessive. Higher LTVs lead to higher consumption levels, because
borrowing constraints are always binding: the more borrowers are o¤ered, the more they take. But
this in turn, as shown in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), changes relative prices. In particular, higher
consumption levels imply higher interest rates. This could lead to a situation of overindebtedness in
the sense that high repayments could o¤set the positive e¤ects on constraint relaxation. In turn, higher
interest rates imply higher returns on saving for savers. Smith (2009) shows that these results do not
rely on the specic assumptions of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009); even in the simplest model with
borrowers, savers, and collateral constraints, this e¤ect takes place.18
Figure 2 shows the welfare gains from introducing a macroprudential tool in the economy, given
the Taylor rule. We use a steady-state value of the LTV of 0.9, as in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
(2013). Therefore, we are in a region in which trade-o¤s should appear. Leaving xed monetary policy,
we present welfare for a continuum of values of the reaction parameters in the LTV rule, from a less to
a more aggressive rule. The gure is very informative because it shows welfare gains for each agent in
the economy and for the aggregate. The conclusions we can obtain from the gure are the following;
18Huggett (1997) also found a similar result, but in this case is the reduction in the precautionary motive for saving,
driven by the looser borrowing constraints, what leads to the increase in the interest rate.
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Using both policy measures at the same time is unambiguously welfare enhancing, as we can observe
from the solid line. We can see that welfare increases by more, the larger the response of the LTV to
credit growth is, but up to a point in which welfare stops increasing. The gure also shows the trade-
o¤ between borrowers and saverswelfare, illustrated by the di¤erence between the two dashed lines.
Borrowerswelfare increases with the introduction of the macroprudential rule because tightening the
collateral constraint avoids situations of overindebtedness in which debt repayments are a burden for
them. Furthermore, borrowers can benet from more nancial stability in the economy, as we will show
later on. Notice that borrowers have a collateral constraint which is always binding and this does not
allow them to make consumption smoothing. They do not have an Euler equation to smooth consumption
as savers do. A more stable nancial system smooths their consumption path thus mitigating the negative
e¤ects of the collateral constraint. This welfare gain is at the expense of savers, who lose from having
this measure in the economy, given that they are not nancially constrained. However, the borrower´s
welfare gain compensates the loss of the savers and globally, the measure is welfare increasing.
Next section performs an optimal policy analysis in order to assess which are the combination of
values of the reaction parameters which would maximize welfare and make policy recommendations on
this issue.
4 Optimal Policy Analysis
4.1 Optimal Parameters
In this section, we aim at nding the optimal combination of policy parameters that maximizes welfare.
For this purpose, we consider three di¤erent cases; a benchmark case in which there is only a monetary
authority that acts in the traditional way, using the interest rate as an instrument. Then, we include a
macroprudential authority that introduces an extra instrument, the LTV ratio. We study the interaction
between the two authorities from two perspectives, when they act both from a coordinated and a non-
coordinated way.
The optimal policy analysis, in models with nancial frictions, deserves some discussion. In the stan-
dard new Keynesian model, the central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and ination
to reduce the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. However, in
models with collateral constraints, welfare analysis and the design of optimal policies involves a number
of issues not considered in standard sticky-price models. In models with constrained individuals, there
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are two types of distortions: price rigidities and credit frictions. This creates conicts and trade-o¤s
between borrowers and savers. Savers may prefer policies that reduce the price stickiness distortion.
However, borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the pervasive e¤ect of the collateral constraint is
softened. Borrowers operate in a second-best situation. They consume according to the borrowing con-
straint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for consumption. Borrowers cannot smooth
consumption by themselves, but a more stable nancial system would provide them a setting in which
their consumption pattern is smoother. Therefore, in order to assess the optimality of policies, factors
that help borrowers smooth their consumption should be included. Studies show that, in these kind
of models, nancial variables should be included in the loss function that the policy maker aims at
minimizing.19
In the standard sticky-price model, the Taylor rule of the central bank is consistent with a loss
function that includes the variability of ination and output. In order to rationalize the Taylor rule
of the macroprudential regulator, we follow Angelini et al. (2012) in which they assume that the loss
function in the economy also contains nancial variables, namely borrowing variability, as a proxy for
nancial stability. Then, there would be a loss function for the economy that would include not only
the variability of output and ination but also the variability of borrowing: L = 2 + y
2
y + 
2
b where
2; 
2
y and 
2
b are the variances of ination, output and borrowing. y  0, represents the relative weight
of the central bank to the stabilization of output.20
If the central bank and the macroprudential regulator coordinate, they would aim at jointly minimiz-
ing the loss function each one with its own instrument. The problem becomes analogous to the Mundells
assignment rule in which each arm of policy concentrates on a single task, addressing the issue it cares
most about, and making coordination of policy trivial.21 Following this line of argument, we consider a
case in which we jointly optimize the parameters of both rules.
However, Svensson (2012) argues that conducting monetary policy and nancial-stability policy in
an integrated way may be inappropriate, since monetary policy and nancial-stability policy are distinct
and separate policies with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments. Tinbergen (1952) put forth
what we now call the Tinbergen principle, that policymakers need at least one independent policy
19Andrés et al. (2013) nd that optimal monetary policy may involve a trade-o¤ between the stabilization of ination,
output gap, consumption gap and the distribution of the collateral asset between constrained and unconstrained consumers.
20This loss function would be consistent with studies that make a second-order approximation of the utility of individuals
and nd that it di¤ers from the standard case by including nancial variables.
21See Mundell (1962).
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instrument for each policy objective. Since the policy interest rate is used by monetary policymakers to
achieve the objective of price stability, at least one other instrument is required to achieve the additional
objective of nancial stability of macroprudential policy. Svenson (2012) suggests that monetary policy
should be in charge of price stability while macroprudential policy needs to address nancial stability. He
argues that monetary policy should be conducted taking the macroprudential policy into account, and
vice-versa, as in a Nash equilibrium rather than a coordinated equilibrium. Therefore, we study a second
case in which the central bank and the macroprudential regulator play a non-coordinated game. The
central bank would nd the optimal parameters in its policy rule, taking the macroprudential regulator
behavior as given. Similarly, the macroprudential authority would nd the best response given monetary
policy. The intersection of these two best responses would give us the Nash equilibrium.
In order to contribute to the discussion and evaluate the welfare gains of introducing macroprudential
polices, we rst compute the optimal parameters of the Taylor rule for monetary policy, assuming that
there is no macroprudential regulator. Then, we compute the optimal monetary and macroprudential
policies for the coordinated and the non-coordinated game.
Table 1 shows the optimal parameter values and the welfare gains in consumption equivalents, taking
as a benchmark the situation without macroprudential policy. We also present the implied volatilities:
Table 1: Optimal Macroprudential and Monetary Policy mix
Benchmark Coordinated Non-coordinated
kb - 0.8 0.7
1 + R 16.1 1.3 1.7
Ry 8.2 0.5 1
Social Welfare Gain - 0.024 0.041
Borrowers Welfare Gain - 0.22 0.31
Savers Welfare Gain - -0.16 -0.21
2b 1.4308 1.1861 1.1767
2 0.2183 0.3481 0.3025
2y 1.9113 1.7877 1.8087
As expected, when there does not exist a macroprudential regulator, the central bank needs to act in
a very aggressive way, given that it only counts with a single instrument to minimize the loss function.22
22Notice that here, we are considering that the central bank acts in a traditional way, we are excluding the possibility
18
We take this case as a benchmark, both for welfare and for macroeconomic and nancial volatilities
(presented in the rst column).
The second column presents the case in which there is a macroprudential regulator that acts in a
coordinated way with the central bank. We see that adding this extra instrument produces a welfare
gain in the economy. In this case, monetary policy does not need to be as aggressive as in the benchmark
case because it counts with the help of the macroprudential policy. However, as already pointed out,
there is a trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers and, while borrowers are better-o¤, savers are not.
Furthermore, if we compare the volatilities that this combination of policies generates, with respect
to the benchmark case, we observe that the standard deviation of borrowing decreases, which is what
makes borrowers welfare increase. In terms of the macroeconomic volatilities, we see that the volatility
of output decreases, but this comes at the expense of a higher ination volatility.23 This higher ination
volatility contributes to decrease saverswelfare.
Nevertheless, if both authorities act in a non-coordinated way, social welfare gains are even higher.
As Svensson (2012) argues, letting each regulator focusing on its own objective, leads to more e¤ective
results in reducing volatilities. In this case, monetary policy acts in a more aggressive way, favoring the
reduction of the volatility of ination. The macroprudential authority reaction parameter does not need
to be as high as in the previous case to obtain a lower standard deviation of borrowing. As usual, we
also observe the same trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers.
4.2 Pareto-superior Outcomes
Results from optimal policy analysis show that trade-o¤s between the two agents appear. However, if the
welfare gain that borrowers obtain is large enough, there could be room for Pareto-superior outcomes.
In order to do that, we apply the concept of KaldorHicks e¢ ciency, also known as KaldorHicks
criterion24. Under this criterion, an outcome is considered more e¢ cient if a Pareto-superior outcome
can be reached by arranging su¢ cient compensation from those that are made better-o¤ to those that
are made worse-o¤ so that all would end up no worse-o¤ than before. The KaldorHicks criterion does
not require the compensation actually being paid, merely that the possibility for compensation exists,
and thus need not leave each at least as well o¤.
that nancial variables enter in the Taylor rule for the central bank. For further discussion on interactions between di¤erent
rules, see Kannan et al. (2012) or Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013).
23This result is consistent with other studies on macroprudential policies. See for instance, Mendicino et al. (2013).
24See Scitovsky (1941).
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In our case, our measure for welfare presented in consumption equivalents is given by equations
(26) and (27). Since, there is a trade-o¤ between savers and borrowers, introducing the macroprudential
policy, both in coordination and non-coordination with monetary policy, produces CEb > 0 and CEs < 0.
Thus, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement to a obtain Pareto-superior outcome would be one in which:
CEb   "b  0
and
CEs + "b = 0:
Then,
"b  1  exp

(1  s)
 
WMPs  W s

: (28)
That is, a system of transfers in which the borrowers would compensate the savers with at least the
amount they are losing, so that they are at least indi¤erent between having or not the macroprudential
policy. Then, the new outcome would be desirable for the society and there would be no agent that
would lose with the introduction of the new policy. Then, if equation (28) holds with equality, the
borrower compensates the saver with the exact welfare that she is losing. Then, in our case, after the
compensations are made, the nal result is the following:
Table 2: Optimal Macroprudential and Monetary Policy mix (Kaldor-Hicks Improvement)
Benchmark Coordinated Non-coordinated
kb - 0.8 0.7
1 + R 16.1 1.3 1.7
Ry 8.2 0.5 1
Social Welfare Gain - 0.024 0.041
Borrowers Welfare Gain - 0.06 0.10
Savers Welfare Gain - 0 0
4.3 Impulse Responses
In order to understand the dynamics of the model and how the LTV rule interacts with monetary policy,
in this section, we simulate the impulse responses of the model, using the optimized parameters we found
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in the previous section. We compare the benchmark (no macroprudential policy) with the case in which
monetary and macroprudential policies coexist, both in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated game.
We consider a technology shock and a housing demand shock.
The discount factor for savers, s, is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98.25 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility
function, j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the
steady state, consistent with the US data. We set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity
of 1.26 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set kSS to 0.90, in line with the US data.27 The labor
income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the estimate in Iacoviello (2005). For the Taylor rule, we
consider the optimized parameters found in the previous section. For  we use 0.8, which also reects a
realistic degree of interest-rate smoothing.28
We assume that technology, At, follows an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally
distributed shock. We also assume that the weight of housing on the utility function is equal to its value
in the steady state plus a shock which follows an autoregressive process with 0:95 persistence.29 For the
reactions parameter in the LTV rule, we use the optimized parameters both for the coordination and
non-coordination with monetary policy. Table 3 presents a summary of the parameter values used:
25Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We
take the most conservative value.
26Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could have a downward bias of 50%.
27See Iacoviello (2013).
28As in McCallum (2001).
29The persistence of the shocks is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a technology shock. Optimized parameters.
Table 3: Parameter Values
s :99 Discount Factor for Savers
b :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k :9 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor share for Savers
X 1:2 Steady-state markup
 :75 Probability of not changing prices
A :9 Technology persistence
j :95 Housing demand shock persistence
 :8 Interest-Rate-Smoothing Parameter in Taylor Rule
4.3.1 Technology Shock
Figure 3 presents impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to technology. Given the technology shock,
output increases and ination decreases.
In the benchmark case, when there is only monetary policy, the interest rate increases, while the
LTV remains at its steady state. Since output is increasing, monetary policy reacts in a contractive way.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a housing demand shock. Optimized parameters.
Given the expansion in the economy, borrowing and housing demand increase, leading to an increase in
house prices.
However, when the macroprudential rule interacts with monetary policy, the reaction of the interest
rate is not as strong, given that the optimal parameters of the Taylor rule are lower. The LTV ratio
decreases to cut credit because borrowing is growing following the boom. Therefore, when the macro-
prudential rule is in place, borrowing does not increase as much as in the benchmark, and this mitigates
the e¤ects of the boom.
Concerning the di¤erence between the coordinated and the non-coordinated case, the pattern of the
impulse responses is very similar. Nevertheless, the non-coordinated case is always slightly closer to the
benchmark. This is due to the fact that the reaction parameters in the Taylor rule are higher for the
coordinated case and thus more similar to the benchmark.
Notice that, interestingly, when monetary and macroprudential policies coexist, the interest rate
decreases, focusing on stabilizing ination, while the LTV is cut, to reach the nancial stability objective.
The decrease in the interest rate contributes to increase borrowing while the decrease in the LTV cuts
it.
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4.3.2 Housing Demand Shock
In gure 4, we see the e¤ects of a 25 percent housing demand shock. Given the increase in demand, house
prices increase as well. This directly a¤ects the collateral constraint and borrowers are able to borrow
more out of their housing collateral, which is worth more now. The wealth e¤ect permits them consume
both more houses and consumption goods. The increase in house prices is, therefore, transmitted to the
real economy and output increases.
The raise in output generates ination and the Taylor rule responds with a higher interest rate. This
is particularly true in the benchmark case in which monetary policy is more aggressive. On impact, this
higher interest rate also dampens the increase in the price of the house, especially for the benchmark
for the same reasons. Therefore, the initial shock is mitigated in the case in which monetary is the only
policy in action.
When the macroprudential and the monetary policy interact, the LTV decreases to moderate the
credit boom. This is the reason why, in this case, borrowing does not increase as much as in the
benchmark. However, as we have seen, the increase in the interest rate is not as strong as in the
benchmark and therefore the e¤ects on real output of this demand shock are more noticeable. In the
case of this shock, the combination of the macroprudential and the monetary policies manage to control
credit without moderating the real e¤ects of the boom.
As in the previous case, and for the same reasons, the non-coordinated situation is closer to the
benchmark.
4.4 Financial and Macroeconomic Stability
Results from the optimal policy analysis have shown that the combination of macroprudential and mon-
etary policies deliver a more stable nancial and macroeconomic scenario. In order to show graphically
these results, we plot an e¢ ciency frontier that includes the three objectives that the policy makers aim
at minimizing: variability of output, variability of ination and variability of borrowing.
Policy analysis is usually done through policy frontiers, also known as Taylor curves or e¢ ciency
frontiers.30 This curve shows, given di¤erent parameters of the Taylor rule, the combination that delivers
the lower output and ination variability. Therefore, a Taylor curve which is closer to the origin would be
more e¢ cient. In order to include the objective of the macroprudential regulator, we present an extended
Taylor curve in which we include the variability of borrowing, as a measure to capture nancial stability.
30See for instance Iacoviello (2005) that evaluates a Taylor rule responding to house prices with a policy frontier.
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Figure 5: Three dimensional e¢ ciency frontier.
We are aware that there is not a widely accepted denition of nancial stability or systemic risk.
Those are di¢ cult concepts to dene and to measure. Many denitions include the interactions between
the nancial and the real sector.31 In our model, we characterize the nancial sector implicitly: borrowers
take credits from savers and sign mortgages to buy houses, the asset of our model. Therefore, the nancial
system can be proxied by the amount of borrowing that takes place. Within this framework, we propose
a measure for nancial stability: a low variability of borrowing. In this sense, a lower variance of
borrowing would imply a more stable nancial system: if the variance of borrowing is lower, credit is
smoother. A more stable nancial system contributes to a lower systemic risk. Our model ts this idea.
Borrowers do not have an Euler equation that allows them to smooth their consumption, as savers do. If
the variability of the borrowing is lower then borrowers can sign mortgages in a smoother way and also
can achieve a more stable consumption. The nancial sector will be more stable and also the real sector.
The economy can benet from a more stable nancial system and a lower systemic risk with a higher
welfare, as we proved in previous sections. However, if the situation is the opposite and there is a high
variability of borrowing, the nancial system will be more unstable: with credit being more variable,
consumption would also be more variable, the systemic risk will increase and, therefore, welfare will be
lower.
Figure 5 presents our augmented policy frontier which is three-dimensional, since it takes into ac-
count three policy objectives: output, ination and nancial stabilization. The rst two correspond to
31See Galvão and Owyang (2013) for a discussion on the topic.
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the standard objectives of the central bank, while the third one would be the objective of the macro-
prudential regulator. As in previous cases, we are comparing the macroprudential (coordinated and
non-coordinated) with the no macroprudential scenario (benchmark). Here, curves are preferable the
lower (less borrowing variance) and closer to the ination and output variance origin (less ination and
output variability) are. We see that when we take the three dimensions together, macroprudential and
monetary policies interacting with each other manage to deliver a more stable scenario, which includes
not only macroeconomic stability but also nancial stability. These results represent a way to convey the
ndings in previous sections, that is, the introduction of the macroprudential policy is welfare enhancing
because it is delivering a more stable system.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the impact of macroprudential and monetary policies on business cycles,
welfare, and nancial stability. In particular, we consider a macroprudential rule on the LTV ratio that
responds to credit growth.
We compute the optimal parameters of the macroprudential and monetary rule both when monetary
and macroprudential policies act in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated way. We nd that in both
cases, this interaction is welfare improving for the society, especially in the case of the non-coordinated
game. However, there is a trade-o¤ between the agents of the model and savers lose from this new
scenario. We nd that by transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks, so that borrowers can compensate the savers
welfare loss, a Pareto-superior outcome can be obtained.
From a positive perspective, we show the dynamics of the model under the optimal parameters that
maximize welfare. We nd that, given a positive technology or housing demand shock, the macropru-
dential authority would decrease the LTV to moderate the credit boom. In this way, it can achieve its
ultimate goal: nancial stability.
We also show graphically, with a three dimensional policy frontier, that the interaction between
monetary and macroprudential policies unambiguously enhances the stability of the economic system.
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Main Equations
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